Campaign N Slice N6, the final implementation slice.
ConnectResponse handshake retransmit:
- While the connection is unconfirmed, the Connect character-list pump
resends the IDENTICAL cleartext ConnectResponse (same sequence 1, same
cookie, the one encoded datagram - no new outbound state) on retail's
strict 0.333333333 s gate. Retail: ClientNet::ProcessConnection
@ 0x00545450, case cs_ConnectionRequestAcked @ 0x0054547B (the constant
load at 0x00545481; the mask-0x41 strictly-greater x87 test at
0x0054548C); ClientNet::SendConnectAck @ 0x005440F0 re-stamps
lastSentHandshake_ (0x00544102) and rebuilds the same cookie packet.
- Confirmation = the first checksum-valid post-negotiation packet whose
header lacks the ConnectRequest flag: retail's cs_ConnectionRequestAcked
-> cs_Connected edge (ClientNet::ProcessPacket @ 0x00545100, the 0x40000
exclusion at 0x0054514E, SetConnectionState(..., 5) at 0x00545160).
- The cadence rides the TransportClock (virtual-clock testable through
TransportClockSource); the Connect deadline stays wall-clock.
- ACE safety pinned against the N0 model: a duplicate while still
AuthConnectResponse re-routes idempotently through NetworkManager's
pre-route; after acceptance CheckState clause 2 drops it pre-CRC at
zero keystream cost.
- Pre-N6, one lost ConnectResponse was a hang to the Connect deadline;
the N5 decorator deliberately arms after this window, so nothing
covered it.
FragmentAssembler eviction (divergence register row AD-52):
- Partials evict 60 s after their last ACCEPTED fragment; the stamp
refreshes on every new fragment (retail's re-stamp rule,
ArrivedEphInfo::UpdateNetBlobID @ 0x0054AE00), so a merely-slow partial
can never age out - 60 s is a floor, not a tunable. Swept from
ReliableTransport.Sweep on retail's 5 s flush cadence
(Indicator::FlushTimedOutEphInfo @ 0x0054A3D0, the gate at 0x0054A3DC;
per-entry ArrivedEphInfo::fTimedOut @ 0x0054AE30). N4's RejectRetransmit
abandonment made an unrecoverable partial a REACHABLE permanent state;
the TTL reclaims it.
- A 64-entry completed-sequence ring drops late duplicate fragments of
already-completed messages instead of allocating a fresh partial that
can never complete (the completed-then-duplicate leak).
Fold-ins:
- N5 review LOW-5: NetProbeTests + LossyTransportDecoratorTests (the
static NetDiagnostics / Console.SetOut mutators) share one
DisableParallelization xunit collection so they never run alongside
classes constructing WorldSession.
- Campaign section 9: N6 ledger row recorded; N5 row verified carrying
4e290f00.
Gates: 757 Core.Net Release tests green (10 new); full solution Release
green (0 failures / 5 skips); connected lifecycle gate PASS; the
N5-strengthened connected loss gate PASS on its first live run (2%/seed 1:
dropped out=3 in=10, resends=1 nak-in=1 nak-out=5, cksum-fail=0
sanity-drop=0 uncached-nak=0).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Campaign N Slice N5 (docs/plans/2026-07-29-network-transport-campaign.md
section 8 rung 3): the permanent removal of the loopback blindness that let
#260 ship. Local ACE never drops a datagram, so every historical connected
gate was structurally incapable of exercising the N1-N4 recovery machinery;
from this slice on, tools/run-connected-loss-gate.ps1 runs the standard
lifecycle route through deterministic seeded loss and passes only on proven
non-zero recovery.
Observability:
- [net-tick] gains resend/s nak-out/s nak-in/s rej-in/s dup-drop/s parked/s
reclaim/s cache= nakset= - TransportStats window deltas mirroring the
acks/s cumulative-delta pattern, plus the two instantaneous depths (the
unbounded-like-retail sent-packet cache watchdog and the inbound NAK set).
TransportStats gains RejectsReceived (inbound RejectRetransmit packets).
Counters increment unconditionally; every string is behind
NetDiagnostics.ProbeNet (Code Structure Rule 5).
- WorldSession.Dispose emits one cumulative [net-final] totals line so the
loss gate asserts exact counters instead of reconstructing them from
rounded per-second rates.
- LinkStatusSnapshot.PacketLossPercentage is deliberately NOT wired: filed
#261 - retail's CLinkStatusAverages formula
(LinkStatusHolder::GetPacketLossPercentage @ 0x00411370) must be located
first; inventing a ratio is forbidden.
N4-review F3 fold-in:
- Fresh reliable sends stamp Header.Iteration = the session iteration
through the same shared retail header build already cited for Time (N3)
and the N4 control packets: FlowQueue::TransmitNewPackets @ 0x00547A60,
the stack build at 0x00547A84/0x00547AA8. The control-header rule now
holds across all three send shapes (fresh reliable, ack, NAK). ACE reads
neither Time nor Iteration inbound (campaign section 3) - wire-safe, and
resends keep the stamp verbatim per the N1 rebuild rule.
Loss injection (Transport/LossyTransportDecorator):
- IWorldSessionTransport wrapper with deterministic seeded per-direction
loss. Config via NetDiagnostics typed env properties read once:
ACDREAM_NET_DROP_PCT (0 = off = default), ACDREAM_NET_DROP_SEED (default
1), ACDREAM_NET_DROP_DIR (out|in|both, default both).
- Arming gate: NOTHING drops in either direction until the decorator has
FORWARDED the first ENCRYPTED outbound datagram - parse-free check on
length > 20 with EncryptedChecksum set in the LE flags word at bytes
4..8. The cleartext handshake always survives and the arming datagram is
never a casualty; handshake-loss testing belongs to N6's ConnectResponse
0.333 s retransmit.
- Structurally absent at 0%: WrapIfConfigured returns the raw transport -
WorldSession's default factory is the only production seam and a normal
run never constructs the decorator.
Root-cause fix the gate immediately exposed:
- The logoff-confirmation wait in Dispose processed inbound datagrams but
never pumped the transport, so a lost S2C logoff confirmation was
gap-detected but its healing NAK never went out. Retail's pump
(Client::UseTime @ 0x00411C40 -> PacketController::UseTime @ 0x005410D0)
runs until LogOffServer; the wait now sweeps per processed datagram,
making the logoff wait the third covered blocking pump (after Tick and
the handshake loops). A lost C2S logoff REQUEST remains unrecoverable by
ACE design (arrival-driven NAK; a quiet client is never NAKed - campaign
section 3 row 1), recorded in the gate header.
Gates:
- tools/run-connected-loss-gate.ps1 (-DropPct 2 -Seed 1): PASS vs local
ACE - the first automated observation of packet loss in project history.
Decorator ledger: dropped out=3 in=10 of forwarded out=183 in=496.
[net-final] resends=2 nak-in=2 nak-out=6 rej-in=0 acks-out=114
acks-in=119 dup-drop=0 sanity-drop=0 cksum-fail=0 parked=9 reclaimed=0
uncached-nak=0 cache=1 nakset=0. Every injected loss healed: both
ACE-driven C2S resend recovery (nak-in=2 -> resends=2) and client-driven
S2C NAK recovery (parked=9 -> nak-out=6) fired on a real connected
route, all six checkpoints validated, graceful logout confirmed, ACE
recorded the transport Disconnect.
- tools/run-connected-world-lifecycle-gate.ps1 (decorator absent): PASS -
zero behavior change on the no-loss baseline; the gate now defensively
clears the drop env vars.
- Core.Net Release: 747/747 (737 + 10 N5: decorator determinism/direction/
arming/structural-absence/env parsing, the 5% seeded WorldSession lossy
lifecycle with zero message loss both ways + ACE Headroom 256, the
[net-tick] field pins, the Iteration stamps).
- Full solution Release: 9,763 passed / 5 skipped / 0 failed.
Test-fixture note: FakeAceTransport gains AutoAdvanceOnBlockingReceive so
virtual time can move during the blocking Connect()/EnterWorld() pumps -
with the clock frozen there, a dropped handshake-window datagram could
never be NAK-healed (a fixture artifact, not a transport property).
Campaign section 9 ledger row added (SHA recorded at N6 kickoff).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Campaign N slice N4 completes the AckNakScheduler NAK branch and closes
the ACE cleartext-reject keystream hazard - the slice that makes S2C
loss actually RECOVER.
NAK emission (SharedNet::EnqueueNaks @ 0x00543BD0):
- One cleartext exact-flags RequestRetransmit per sweep behind the
STRICT 0.6 s gate on the ONE shared timestamp (the x87 0x41-mask test
at 0x00543C03 proceeds only on strictly-greater; the ack's gate stays
>=). Never an ack in a NAK sweep; a NAK delays the next ack by 2.0 s
and vice versa (landmine #7).
- Body = u32 count + ids ascending, capped at 114 (ReceiverData::GetNaks
@ 0x005490C0, cap 0x72; the m_cbData = 4*count+4 store at 0x00543C3E);
header Sequence borrowed from highestIDSent_ without incrementing;
cleartext or ACE ignores it (landmine #6, NetworkSession.cs:283-284) -
and a NAK never refreshes ACE's 60 s timeout.
- Control-header rule decided once for BOTH ack and NAK: Time = the
interval id, Iteration = the session iteration, matching retail's
shared header build (FlowQueue::TransmitNewPackets @ 0x00547A60, the
stack build at 0x00547A84). ACE reads neither field inbound.
- Gate ticks now round instead of truncate: 0.6 has no exact double
form, and truncation opened the strict gate exactly AT the boundary.
RejectRetransmit reclaim (divergence register AD-51, ACE adaptation):
- ACE's RejectRetransmit consumes a FRESH sequence, cleartext, with NO
keystream word, and is cached (ACE NetworkSession.cs:299-304,
:722-725, :743-748) - the one place ACE breaks retail's gap-walk
invariant that every missing id was word-bearing (retail cleartext
always borrows live sequences). Unhandled, the gap walk parks a word
for the reject's id and the inbound stream runs permanently one word
ahead - the N2 desync class reintroduced through the reject path.
- Fix: on a VALIDATED cleartext reject, InboundSequenceTracker removes
the mis-park, shifts every later-drawn parked word down one position
(per-word draw ordinals; ascending wrap-safe id <=> ascending draw
order), and pools the excess word, consumed lowest-draw-order-first
ahead of fresh ISAAC draws. Exact for any number of interleaved
rejects in ANY arrival order - a plain reclaim FIFO is not: a reject
arriving after a higher encrypted arrival crosses the parked chain,
and two out-of-order rejects pool their excess words out of draw
order (both orderings pinned by tests).
- Reject BODY ids keep N2's discard: word-bearing server-side,
consumed-in-place. The pool is provably empty against retail servers.
N3 advisories folded (all five): honest transitional-state wording (the
empty N3 NAK branch could silently disconnect a loopback session at
ACE's 60 s timeout, witness [net-tick] acks/s=0), the
ReceiverData::SharedInit @ 0x00548EF0 (from Init @ 0x00548FA0)
citation, the FlowQueue::Empty pump-order wording (TransmitNaks ->
TransmitAcks -> TransmitNewPackets with the interval increment LAST @
0x00548A9D; our clock-first Sweep is cosmetic vs ACE), the
Time/Iteration rule above, and the stale WorldSession budget-break
comment rewritten to the sweep reality.
Tests: 737 Core.Net green (14 new in NakEmissionTests + updated N3
pins): strict-gate boundary, shared timestamp both directions,
NAK-xor-ack exclusivity, full wire-shape + 114-cap pins, model-served
retransmission round trip, five tracker reclaim proofs, the 130 s
virtual prune -> fresh-sequence reject system test (victim abandoned,
later traffic decodes, pool drains to zero), 10 s long-loss survival
(NAKs on the gate cadence, zero acks, heal inside the window), and the
capstone soak: 2% seeded bidirectional loss x 10,000 messages -> zero
message loss both ways, ACE crypto headroom 256 at convergence, every
ledger drained (cache at the single watermark entry - retail's Flush
prunes STRICTLY below the ack). Full solution Release: 9,758 passed /
5 skipped. Connected world-lifecycle gate PASS
(logs/connected-world-gate-20260729-150238); canonical nine-stop soak
PASS (logs/connected-r6-soak-20260729-150856).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Campaign N slice N3. Retail never acks per packet: SharedNet::EnqueuePak
@ 0x00543B10 is the binary's only AckSequence (0x4000) construction site,
gated at >= 2.0 s on ReceiverData::timeStamp_ (@ +0x10), armed at
connection birth by ReceiverData::Init @ 0x00548EF0, and arbitrated
NAK-xor-ack per sweep by ClientNet::ProcessConnection @ 0x00545450
(m_SeqIDsWeNAKed non-empty -> EnqueueNaks, else EnqueuePak;
SharedNet::EnqueueNaks @ 0x00543BD0 shares the SAME timestamp -
campaign landmine #7).
- New Transport/AckNakScheduler: owns the one shared timestamp; a
non-empty NAK set suppresses the ack (N4 emits RequestRetransmit in
that branch; in N3 it emits nothing - a documented transitional state,
safe for exactly one slice on loopback), else ONE cleartext exact-flags
AckSequence carrying the tracker's HighestIdReceived, header sequence
borrowed from HighestIdSent without incrementing, 4-byte LE body.
Flags are an EQUALITY, never an OR (landmine #5 - ACE's dedup
exemption NetworkSession.cs:342-343 and watermark-skip :474-476 both
require the exact value).
- ReliableTransport.Sweep pump order per FlowQueue::Empty @ 0x00548A20:
interval clock, NAK/ack arbitration, pending resends, prune. The sweep
already runs in Tick and both handshake pump loops (landmine #8), so
cumulative acks flow during the character-list/enter-world floods at
ACE's own ~2 s cadence.
- WorldSession: the Phase 4.9 per-packet reflex ack in ProcessDatagram
and SendAck are DELETED; the [net-tick] acks/s probe now reads
Stats.AcksSent; new internal TransportClockSource seam drives the
2.0 s gate on virtual time in the conformance suite.
- N1 Fable-review advisory retired (Time-stamp fold-in): fresh reliable
sends now stamp Header.Time = the current interval id, matching retail
FlowQueue::TransmitNewPackets @ 0x00547A60 (header build at
0x00547A84); resends already re-stamped. ACE never reads inbound
Header.Time, so the wire stays compatible.
Tests: 723 Core.Net (7 new) - gate cadence + watermark-at-emission,
flags-equality pin + model acceptance at the reused sequence without a
watermark advance, NAK suppression and resume after the gap clears, a
50-packet CreateObject flood collapsing to ONE ack, the quiet-session
keepalive property across a 120 s virtual horizon (the reflex ack's
keepalive role, replaced and proven against ACE's 60 s TimeoutDeadline),
the Time fold-in, and a full FakeAceTransport lifecycle with zero
CRC/state/duplicate drops. Full solution Release: 9,744 passed /
5 skipped / 0 failed. Connected world-lifecycle gate PASS (capped +
uncapped-reconnect, graceful exits, 0 failures); canonical nine-stop
route PASS (0 failures).
Campaign section 9 N3 row updated (complete; SHA recorded at N4
kickoff).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Campaign N Slice N2 (docs/plans/2026-07-29-network-transport-campaign.md
S2.2) - the second fatal #260 fix: the inbound keystream now aligns to
SEQUENCE order instead of arrival order. One lost S2C datagram no longer
desyncs the inbound cipher permanently - the missing id's pre-drawn key
parks in the NAK set, later packets keep decoding, and the retransmission
decodes with the parked key.
New src/AcDream.Core.Net/Transport/InboundSequenceTracker.cs - retail's
ReceiverData inbound half, ported rule for rule:
- Sanity window: drop when seq is wrap-safe newer than
highestIDReceived_ + 0x7FFF (SharedNet::SeqIDSanityCheck @ 0x00543A20;
the boundary itself is accepted).
- Duplicate/late arrival (encrypted, at/below the watermark): NAK-set
hit -> decrypt with the PARKED pre-drawn key; miss -> silent drop at
ZERO keystream cost (SharedNet::ProcessNewSeqNum @ 0x00544690, the
AVL::Remove branch) - the dup-word-burn and double-dispatch bugs close
together.
- Gap walk (SharedNet::ProcessNewestSeqNum @ 0x00541930): one inbound
ISAAC word per missing id, drawn IN SEQUENCE ORDER BEFORE the arriving
packet's own key (landmine #4), parked beside the id
(ReceiverData::AddNakked @ 0x00549240, idempotent; id 0 skipped per
retail's `if (esi_1 != 0)`). Cleartext walks to seq+1 - the borrowed
id itself gets NAKed, so the real encrypted packet at that id can
still decode later.
- Verify-failure re-park: a sequenced encrypted checksum failure parks
the consumed key back beside its id so the retransmission decodes
(SharedNet::ProcessPacket @ 0x00544790 tail, AddNakked(seq, &key)).
- Inbound RejectRetransmit -> silent NAK-set abandonment; parked keys
discarded, alignment holds because the words were already drawn
(SharedNet::HandleEmptyAck @ 0x005448F0).
- NAK set = SortedDictionary<uint,uint> seq -> parked key; ascending
raw-uint enumeration matches retail's AVL walk for N4's <=114-id NAK
emission (ReceiverData::GetNaks @ 0x005490C0).
PacketCodec split (campaign S4, retail's own factoring - the key is an
optional in/out of ReceiverData::Decrypt): TryParseBorrowed is the pure
parse + checksum-summand computation with NO keystream access anywhere;
VerifyChecksum(header, headerHash, payloadHash, uint? key) compares the
additive cleartext form (null) or headerHash + (key ^ payloadHash).
TryDecodeBorrowed(datagram, IsaacRandom?) - the consume-before-compare
site that WAS the bug - is deleted; the owned TryDecode stays
(test-only). RejectRetransmit ids are now exposed on both decoders
(borrowed RejectRetransmitBytes/Count like the Request pair; owned
RejectRetransmits list); the bytes were always inside the hashed span,
so parse-hash coverage is unchanged.
WorldSession: ProcessDatagram head is now parse -> sequence-0 split
(cleartext seq-0 = handshake/control, verified additively and processed
as before; encrypted seq-0 dropped before any keystream access, like
retail's ProcessPacket) -> tracker.Admit -> VerifyChecksum with the
admission key -> failure re-park -> unchanged flag handling, N1
transport consumption, reflex ack, and fragment loop. The
RejectRetransmit flag routes to the tracker beside the N1 NAK/ack
consumption. The handshake Connect loop moved to parse +
cleartext-verify (no tracker exists before ISAAC seeding; the
ConnectRequest is cleartext seq 0). ReliableTransport now takes both
Isaacs and exposes Inbound; the session's _inboundIsaac field is
deleted. No production caller constructed the N1 ctor outside
WorldSession, so no compatibility shape was kept.
TransportStats gains InboundDupsDropped, InboundSanityDrops,
ChecksumFailures, KeysParked (unconditional, like the N1 counters).
Watermark init = 1 is an ACE adaptation, register row AD-50 (watermark
INIT only, not a mechanism change; AD-49 stays reserved for the campaign
S5 blob-layer deferral): retail zero-inits ReceiverData, but ACE never
emits S2C sequence 1 - PacketSequence starts unprimed at uint.MaxValue,
the cleartext ConnectRequest takes NextValue 0, and the first ENCRYPTED
flush re-primes CurrentValue to 1 so the first encrypted sequenced
packet is 2 (ACE NetworkSession.cs:716-717 resolving to
UIntSequence(startingValue: 1), Sequence/UIntSequence.cs:9-13,30-41).
A zero-init watermark would gap-walk the permanent id-1 hole: one
spurious NAK, the first pre-drawn word mis-assigned to id 1, and the
keystream off by one from the first encrypted packet onward. holtburger
seeds the same value (crates/holtburger-session/src/session/api.rs:30,
last_server_seq: 1), mirroring ACE's own C2S-side
lastReceivedPacketSequence = 1 (NetworkSession.cs:57). The N0 model's
dance is pinned by the clean-lifecycle conformance test: min encrypted
S2C sequence == 2, zero NAKs, zero spurious drops.
Tests (+14; Core.Net 702 -> 716): the decisive gap test (10,11,13,14 -
13 and 14 decode with fresh words while 12's key parks with
KeysParked=1/NakCount=1, the late 12 decodes with the parked key, 15
takes the next fresh word - impossible pre-N2), zero-cost duplicate
drop (shadow ISAAC position unchanged), re-park -> byte-identical
retransmission decode, the cleartext borrowed-id rule, cleartext at the
watermark (no NAK/key/watermark change), sanity boundary +0x7FFF
accepted / +0x8000 dropped wrap-safe, skip-id-0 across the 32-bit wrap
with ascending NAK enumeration, RejectRetransmit abandonment with
alignment held, warm zero-alloc Admit; plus four real-WorldSession
conformance runs against the N0 ACE double: clean lifecycle (zero NAKs
at every stage), S2C loss of one packet of a Count=2 fragment set
(later packets STILL decode - the N2 win; late byte-identical
redelivery completes the split message intact), duplicate delivery
dropped BEFORE dispatch, and the seq-0 tracker bypass.
N3/N4 handoff notes are recorded in the campaign S9 N2 row: the interim
per-packet reflex ack acks the arriving sequence even while a gap is
parked (ACE prunes the lost id from its S2C cache before N4 could NAK
it - message recovery needs N3's retail NAK-xor-ack sweep), and ACE's
RejectRetransmit consumes a fresh CLEARTEXT sequence with no keystream
word, an ACE-vs-retail wrinkle N4's design must resolve.
Gates: dotnet build green; AcDream.Core.Net.Tests 716/716;
full-solution Release 9,732 passed / 5 skipped / 0 failed; connected
world-lifecycle gate vs local ACE RESULT=PASS (zero failures, one
pre-existing expected world-edge landblock-miss warning); canonical
nine-stop connected route RESULT=PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Campaign N Slice N1 (docs/plans/2026-07-29-network-transport-campaign.md
S2.1) - the direct #260 fix: every sent reliable packet is now cached and
re-emitted, header-rebuilt, when ACE NAKs a client-sequence gap. One lost
C2S datagram no longer voids every subsequent action for the session's
lifetime.
New src/AcDream.Core.Net/Transport/:
- TransportClock: injectable monotonic source + retail's 0.5 s interval
counter (ClientFlowQueue::IncrementLocalInterval @ 0x00547F10, tail
`intervalID_ += elapsed`; the same function's ~3 s TimeSync/Echo cadence
stays deferred per TS-58).
- SequenceMath: wrap-safe IsNewer/Max (TimeStampUtils::lhs_newer
@ 0x00543890, reduced to the signed-difference form).
- SentPacketStore: FIFO of ArrayPool-rented wire buffers; Add asserts
optionalLength == 0 (NetPacket::RemoveDisposableOptionalHeaders
@ 0x00549510 pinned as a no-op under standalone-control); FlushOlderThan
pops strictly-older wrap-safe (SentPacketStore::AddSentPacket
@ 0x0054AB00, Flush @ 0x0054ACD0).
- OutboundFlowQueue: owns the outbound ISAAC, highestIDSent (starts 1,
pre-increment, wrap 0xFFFFFFFF->1, never 0), the fragment sequence, the
store, the wrap-safe sorted dedup pending-resend list
(FlowQueue::EnqueueAcks @ 0x005488E0), and the flushNum_ ack watermark.
Cache commit happens AFTER a successful send
(FlowQueue::TransmitNewPackets @ 0x00547A60, commit site 0x00547C85).
NAK ids[0] folds into the watermark as retail's implicit cumulative ack
(RecipientData::ProcessNaks @ 0x00547010). A resend rebuilds ONLY the
20-byte header: flags Retransmission|EncryptedChecksum (|BlobFragments
with fragments), Time = current interval id, Sequence/Id/Iteration/
DataSize verbatim, checksum = fresh header hash + stored sealed checksum
(FlowQueue::TransmitAcks @ 0x005485B0, DequeueAck @ 0x005472F0). The
original ISAAC key rides inside the sealed value - no new keystream word
is ever drawn (CryptoSystem::EncryptData @ 0x0065FF40 non-null-key
path; landmines #1/#2). Resend only on explicit NAK (landmine #3).
- ReliableTransport: composition + Sweep() (interval clock, resends,
prune). The AckNakScheduler joins in N3/N4; ack behavior is untouched
this slice.
- TransportStats: unconditional counters (ResendsSent,
NakRequestsReceived, UncachedNakIds, AcksConsumed) + CacheDepth.
PacketCodec.FinalizeInPlace gains an overload returning (isaacKeyUsed,
sealedChecksum) where sealedChecksum is the pre-header-hash value -
payloadHash cleartext, isaacKey ^ payloadHash encrypted (retail
NetPacket::checksum_). The old signature forwards; encode bytes are
unchanged. Decode is untouched.
WorldSession integration is minimal: the transport is constructed at
ISAAC-seeding time (first reliable packet keeps sequence 2 / fragment 1,
byte-identical to pre-N1); SendGameMessage delegates (probe fseq/pseq now
read the transport); SendAck's borrowed sequence reads HighestIdSent
(identical value, behavior EXACTLY as-is this slice); ProcessDatagram
consumes RequestRetransmit + AckSequence BEFORE the unchanged reflex ack;
the sweep runs at the end of Tick() after the budget break AND inside
both blocking handshake pump loops (Connect step 4, EnterWorld
ServerReady - landmine #8), gated on _transportNegotiated; Dispose
returns the rented cache buffers.
Bookkeeping: TS-57 filed in the divergence register (uncached NAK ids
dropped silently + counted instead of retail's RejectRetransmit - ACE
no-ops the reject and the standalone unsequenced form would trip ACE's
watermark hole); TS-27 narrowed to the inbound direction in the same
commit; the stale WorldSession class-doc gap list corrected.
N0 fold-ins from the re-review: AceSessionModel.ProcessFragment split
into ACE's two literal branches (existing-buffer checks Complete,
NetworkSession.cs:495-507; new-buffer constructs + adds + TryAdds WITHOUT
checking Complete, :509-518), and the zero-count-fragment test now pins
the parked dead buffer (PartialFragmentBufferCount 0 -> 1). e3958610
recorded in the campaign ledger's N0 row.
Tests: 15 new in Transport/OutboundReliableTransportTests.cs - store
FIFO/strict/wrap-safe flush with rent/return balance via a counting
pool, interval-clock start/advance/wrap, resend header shape (flags
exactly 3 or 7, Time = interval, verbatim fields, checksum identity,
bit-identical body), resend-consumes-no-ISAAC-word, uncached-NAK
counting, ids[0] watermark fold + strict prune, wrap-safe ack max,
conformance resend verifying under AceCryptoModel with the ORIGINAL
parked key (Headroom 256, zero orphans, ordering restored), an
end-to-end FakeAceTransport lossy run (10 game actions, C2S #5 dropped,
all 10 dispatched in order, exactly one resend, session alive), and
zero-alloc steady-state SendGameMessage.
Gates: dotnet build green; AcDream.Core.Net.Tests 702/702; full-solution
Release 9,723 passed / 5 skipped / 0 failed; connected world-lifecycle
gate vs local ACE RESULT=PASS (0 failures, both sessions exit 0; one
pre-existing expected world-edge landblock-miss warning).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses the N0 review findings against commit 7e9134b4. Test-only: no
production code changes.
F1 (blocking) - model Session.CheckState (Session.cs:93-110). A three-value
AceSessionState (AuthLoginRequest -> AuthConnectResponse -> AuthConnected)
advances on SendConnectRequest (AuthenticationHandler.cs:127, :232) and on the
accepted ConnectResponse (NetworkManager.cs:77). CheckState runs as the first
statement of Receive after TryParse - ahead of the ConnectResponse route and
ahead of VerifyCRC - so a LoginRequest out of state, a replayed
ConnectResponse, or any of AckSequence|TimeSync|EchoRequest|Flow during
AuthLoginRequest is dropped at zero keystream cost (ACE's PacketHeader.HasFlag
is ANY-of, PacketHeader.cs:70). New StateDropCount counter.
F2 - implement SendBundle faithfully (NetworkSession.cs:808-919). One
NetworkBundle per GameMessageGroup (NetworkBundle.cs:6-63), swapped out and
sent in ascending group order; the InvalidQueue bundle carries the ack /
TimeSync / EchoResponse optional headers. As many same-bundle fragments as fit
the 464-byte body budget now travel in ONE packet - one sequence, one keystream
word - and a message whose remaining data fills a packet splits across packets
with Count>1 fragments (:846-854, :874-888) via a port of ACE's server-side
MessageFragment (MessageFragment.cs:10-103). The old "one packet per message"
shortcut and its incorrect rationale are gone.
F3 - model the two-phase termination. Terminate arms PendingTermination with
the 2 s window (Session.cs:281-298, SessionTerminationDetails.cs:12); inbound
and outbound keep running through it (Session.cs:124-133), then the pump
completes the session work and releases the network resources
(NetworkManager.cs:366-369 -> Session.cs:300-334 -> NetworkSession.cs:958-974).
IsTerminated now means "termination armed"; IsReleased is the point of no
return.
F4 - port ACE's MessageBuffer exactly (MessageBuffer.cs:7-54): a List, not an
index-addressed array. An assembled stream under 4 bytes returns null and is
dropped WITHOUT advancing the fragment gate (:49-50 + NetworkSession.cs:504-506
removing the buffer either way), and a later fragment claiming a larger
Count/Index for the same sequence completes the message instead of throwing.
F5 - the C2S parse path now characterizes ACE: fragment parsing uses ACE's
complete validation (16 <= Size <= 464, ClientPacketFragment.cs:12-24) with no
Count==0 / Index>=Count rejection and with ReadBytes' short-read tolerance,
instead of inheriting acdream's stricter production layout check. The one
remaining strictness we inherit - the 1024-id cap on retransmit lists - is
documented as unreachable (ACE reads into a 1024-byte buffer, so a C2S datagram
can carry at most 250 ids).
F6 - class doc now states that C2S CRC verification reuses acdream's own
PacketHeaderOptional hashing, so the double is NOT an independent oracle on
optional-header wire layout, and names the two known asymmetries (ACE has no
inbound ConnectRequest parse; ACE hashes-but-does-not-advance on
LoginRequest / WorldLoginRequest / ConnectResponse).
F7 - hardened three weak tests: the NAK rate limit is probed at 0.9 s and at
exactly 1.0 s (both closed) before 1.1 s opens it; the session timeout is
probed at exactly 60 s after fixing the model's `>` to ACE's `>=`
(Session.cs:140); the cache prune pins that an entry exactly 120 s old survives
(:258 is strictly greater).
F9 - campaign doc section 9 ledger: N0 row marked complete.
Nine new tests; 687 Core.Net tests green in Release.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Campaign N slice N0 (docs/plans/2026-07-29-network-transport-campaign.md):
the referee that slices N1-N5 are graded against, test-project only, zero
production changes.
- VirtualClock: Stopwatch-shaped deterministic time source (fixed 100 ns
ticks) that N1 will inject behind the production TransportClock.
- AceCryptoModel: verbatim port of ACE CryptoSystem Search/ConsumeKey over
our IsaacRandom - 256-key window, parked-key set, Headroom/OrphanCount
diagnostics (CryptoSystem.cs:8-49 cited per method).
- AceSessionModel: transport-free ACE NetworkSession over raw datagrams,
every rule cited to NetworkSession.cs - CRC-before-everything silent
drop, cleartext-NAK early return (no timeout refresh, :283-308),
60 s timeout refresh (:329-331), exact-equality ack dedup exemption
(:342-347), desired+2 NAK trigger with 1 s limit (:351-363), >window
AbnormalSequenceReceived (:393-397), the :474-476 watermark hole,
ack-value cache prune (:663-673), fragment gate (:532-543), seq>=2
caching (:730), Retransmission-flag resends with the ORIGINAL IssacXor
(:675-686), RejectRetransmit, 2 s cleartext cumulative ack, 20 s
TimeSync, EchoResponse, 120 s cache prune (:251-262). ACE's raw
wrap-unsafe comparisons are modeled bug-for-bug, not fixed.
- LossyLink: deterministic drop/reorder/seeded-loss fault injector, pure
data structure.
- FakeAceTransport: IWorldSessionTransport binding a REAL WorldSession to
the model through the link, with the handshake scripted (ConnectRequest
reusing the negotiation fixture layout, CharacterList, ServerReady,
logoff confirmation) - genuine Connect/EnterWorld/Tick/Dispose with no
sockets.
- 19 new tests pin the double, including
CleartextNonAckAdvancesWatermark_TheAceHole (the self-induced wedge
behind scope rows TS-57/TS-58/AP-125), re-key = permanent orphan,
unrequested-resend window burn, the 115-id NAK cap boundary, and a
full no-socket session lifecycle with both ISAAC streams verified
aligned end-to-end.
Core.Net suite: 678 passed / 0 failed (659 existing + 19 new).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Erik