Campaign N Slice N6, the final implementation slice.
ConnectResponse handshake retransmit:
- While the connection is unconfirmed, the Connect character-list pump
resends the IDENTICAL cleartext ConnectResponse (same sequence 1, same
cookie, the one encoded datagram - no new outbound state) on retail's
strict 0.333333333 s gate. Retail: ClientNet::ProcessConnection
@ 0x00545450, case cs_ConnectionRequestAcked @ 0x0054547B (the constant
load at 0x00545481; the mask-0x41 strictly-greater x87 test at
0x0054548C); ClientNet::SendConnectAck @ 0x005440F0 re-stamps
lastSentHandshake_ (0x00544102) and rebuilds the same cookie packet.
- Confirmation = the first checksum-valid post-negotiation packet whose
header lacks the ConnectRequest flag: retail's cs_ConnectionRequestAcked
-> cs_Connected edge (ClientNet::ProcessPacket @ 0x00545100, the 0x40000
exclusion at 0x0054514E, SetConnectionState(..., 5) at 0x00545160).
- The cadence rides the TransportClock (virtual-clock testable through
TransportClockSource); the Connect deadline stays wall-clock.
- ACE safety pinned against the N0 model: a duplicate while still
AuthConnectResponse re-routes idempotently through NetworkManager's
pre-route; after acceptance CheckState clause 2 drops it pre-CRC at
zero keystream cost.
- Pre-N6, one lost ConnectResponse was a hang to the Connect deadline;
the N5 decorator deliberately arms after this window, so nothing
covered it.
FragmentAssembler eviction (divergence register row AD-52):
- Partials evict 60 s after their last ACCEPTED fragment; the stamp
refreshes on every new fragment (retail's re-stamp rule,
ArrivedEphInfo::UpdateNetBlobID @ 0x0054AE00), so a merely-slow partial
can never age out - 60 s is a floor, not a tunable. Swept from
ReliableTransport.Sweep on retail's 5 s flush cadence
(Indicator::FlushTimedOutEphInfo @ 0x0054A3D0, the gate at 0x0054A3DC;
per-entry ArrivedEphInfo::fTimedOut @ 0x0054AE30). N4's RejectRetransmit
abandonment made an unrecoverable partial a REACHABLE permanent state;
the TTL reclaims it.
- A 64-entry completed-sequence ring drops late duplicate fragments of
already-completed messages instead of allocating a fresh partial that
can never complete (the completed-then-duplicate leak).
Fold-ins:
- N5 review LOW-5: NetProbeTests + LossyTransportDecoratorTests (the
static NetDiagnostics / Console.SetOut mutators) share one
DisableParallelization xunit collection so they never run alongside
classes constructing WorldSession.
- Campaign section 9: N6 ledger row recorded; N5 row verified carrying
4e290f00.
Gates: 757 Core.Net Release tests green (10 new); full solution Release
green (0 failures / 5 skips); connected lifecycle gate PASS; the
N5-strengthened connected loss gate PASS on its first live run (2%/seed 1:
dropped out=3 in=10, resends=1 nak-in=1 nak-out=5, cksum-fail=0
sanity-drop=0 uncached-nak=0).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
289 lines
12 KiB
C#
289 lines
12 KiB
C#
using System.Buffers.Binary;
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using System.Net;
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using AcDream.Core.Net.Cryptography;
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using AcDream.Core.Net.Packets;
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using AcDream.Core.Net.Transport;
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namespace AcDream.Core.Net.Tests.Transport;
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/// <summary>
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/// Campaign N Slice N6 — the ConnectResponse handshake retransmit.
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///
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/// <para>
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/// Retail: while a connection sits in <c>cs_ConnectionRequestAcked</c>,
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/// <c>ClientNet::ProcessConnection @ 0x00545450</c> (case 0 at 0x0054547B)
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/// re-sends the ConnectResponse every 0.333333333 s — strictly-greater gate
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/// on <c>lastSentHandshake_</c> (mask-0x41 x87 test at 0x0054548C) —
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/// through <c>ClientNet::SendConnectAck @ 0x005440F0</c>, which re-stamps
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/// the clock (0x00544102) and rebuilds the same cookie packet. The resend
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/// stops when the first successfully processed non-ConnectRequest packet
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/// promotes the connection to <c>cs_Connected</c>
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/// (<c>ClientNet::ProcessPacket @ 0x00545100</c>, the state set at
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/// 0x00545160).
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/// </para>
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///
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/// <para>
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/// Clocking: the retry cadence rides the TransportClock, so these tests
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/// drive it on VIRTUAL time (<c>TransportClockSource</c> +
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/// <c>AutoAdvanceOnBlockingReceive</c>); only the Connect deadline is
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/// wall-clock. Before N6 the first test hung to that deadline — a lost
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/// ConnectResponse was an unconditional Connect failure, and the N5 loss
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/// decorator deliberately arms AFTER the handshake window, so nothing
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/// covered it.
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/// </para>
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/// </summary>
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public sealed class ConnectResponseRetransmitTests
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{
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/// <summary>THE N6 conformance test: the first ConnectResponse datagram
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/// dies on the wire; the 0.333 s retry lands; the session completes.
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/// Exactly one retry — confirmation (the first decoded server packet)
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/// stops the cadence.</summary>
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[Fact]
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public void Connect_FirstConnectResponseDropped_RetryHealsHandshake()
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{
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var fake = new FakeAceTransport
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{
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AutoAdvanceOnBlockingReceive = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(200),
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};
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int connectResponsesSent = 0;
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fake.Link.Drop(LinkDirection.ClientToServer, (_, datagram) =>
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{
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if (!IsConnectResponse(datagram))
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return false;
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connectResponsesSent++;
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return connectResponsesSent == 1; // only the FIRST one dies
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});
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int accepted = 0;
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fake.Model.ConnectResponseAccepted += () => accepted++;
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using var session = new WorldSession(
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new IPEndPoint(IPAddress.Loopback, 9000),
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fake);
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session.TransportClockSource =
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(fake.Clock.GetTimestamp, fake.Clock.Frequency);
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session.Connect("testaccount", "testpassword", TimeSpan.FromSeconds(10));
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Assert.Equal(WorldSession.State.InCharacterSelect, session.CurrentState);
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Assert.NotNull(session.Characters);
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// Original + exactly one retry, and none after confirmation (the
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// CharacterList response follows the accepted retry immediately).
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Assert.Equal(2, connectResponsesSent);
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Assert.Equal(1, accepted);
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// The retry arrived while ACE was still AuthConnectResponse — the
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// NetworkManager pre-route accepted it; nothing was state-dropped
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// and no keystream/CRC cost was paid anywhere.
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Assert.Equal(0, fake.Model.StateDropCount);
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Assert.Equal(0, fake.Model.CrcDropCount);
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Assert.Equal(0, fake.Model.DuplicateDropCount);
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Assert.Equal(256, fake.Model.Crypto.Headroom);
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}
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/// <summary>A clean handshake sends exactly ONE ConnectResponse: with
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/// the virtual clock frozen (no auto-advance) the strict 0.333 s gate
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/// can never open, and confirmation lands on the first pump.</summary>
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[Fact]
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public void Connect_CleanHandshake_SendsExactlyOneConnectResponse()
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{
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var fake = new FakeAceTransport();
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int connectResponsesSent = 0;
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fake.Link.Drop(LinkDirection.ClientToServer, (_, datagram) =>
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{
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if (IsConnectResponse(datagram))
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connectResponsesSent++;
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return false; // tap only
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});
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using var session = new WorldSession(
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new IPEndPoint(IPAddress.Loopback, 9000),
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fake);
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session.TransportClockSource =
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(fake.Clock.GetTimestamp, fake.Clock.Frequency);
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session.Connect("testaccount", "testpassword", TimeSpan.FromSeconds(10));
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Assert.NotNull(session.Characters);
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Assert.Equal(1, connectResponsesSent);
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Assert.Equal(0, fake.Model.StateDropCount);
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// The duplicate-in-flight scenario: ACE accepted the ConnectResponse
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/// but its S2C responses died, so the unconfirmed client keeps
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/// retrying. Every duplicate lands harmlessly (ACE's
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/// <c>Session.CheckState</c> clause 2 drops it pre-CRC at zero
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/// keystream cost), and the dropped responses heal through the normal
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/// N2/N4 gap-walk → NAK → cached-retransmit path once ACE's 2 s ack
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/// reveals the gap.
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/// </summary>
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[Fact]
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public void Connect_ServerResponsesLost_RetriesDropHarmlessly_SessionHeals()
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{
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var fake = new FakeAceTransport
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{
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AutoAdvanceOnBlockingReceive = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(200),
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};
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// S2C transmit index 0 is the ConnectRequest; indices 1 and 2 are
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// the TimeSync + CharacterList responses to the accepted
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// ConnectResponse. Drop both responses.
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fake.Link.DropAt(LinkDirection.ServerToClient, 1);
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fake.Link.DropAt(LinkDirection.ServerToClient, 2);
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int connectResponsesSent = 0;
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fake.Link.Drop(LinkDirection.ClientToServer, (_, datagram) =>
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{
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if (IsConnectResponse(datagram))
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connectResponsesSent++;
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return false; // tap only
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});
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int accepted = 0;
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fake.Model.ConnectResponseAccepted += () => accepted++;
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using var session = new WorldSession(
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new IPEndPoint(IPAddress.Loopback, 9000),
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fake);
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session.TransportClockSource =
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(fake.Clock.GetTimestamp, fake.Clock.Frequency);
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session.Connect("testaccount", "testpassword", TimeSpan.FromSeconds(10));
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Assert.NotNull(session.Characters);
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// The first ConnectResponse was accepted; at least one retry went
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// out while the client sat unconfirmed, and every one of them was
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// state-dropped by the model without side effects.
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Assert.Equal(1, accepted);
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Assert.True(connectResponsesSent >= 2,
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$"expected retries, saw {connectResponsesSent}");
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Assert.True(fake.Model.StateDropCount >= 1,
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$"expected CheckState drops, saw {fake.Model.StateDropCount}");
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Assert.Equal(0, fake.Model.CrcDropCount);
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Assert.Equal(0, fake.Model.DuplicateDropCount);
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// The dropped TimeSync/CharacterList healed via the client NAK →
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// ACE cached-retransmit path, with the parked-key discipline intact.
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Assert.True(session.Transport!.Stats.NaksSent >= 1);
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Assert.True(session.Transport.Stats.KeysParked >= 2);
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Assert.Equal(0, session.Transport.Stats.ChecksumFailures);
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Assert.Equal(256, fake.Model.Crypto.Headroom);
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}
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/// <summary>Model-level pin of the ACE-safety claim: a duplicate
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/// ConnectResponse AFTER acceptance is dropped by CheckState clause 2
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/// (Session.cs:98-99 / NetworkManager.cs:60-66) before CRC — harmless,
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/// stateless, zero keystream cost.</summary>
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[Fact]
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public void AceModel_DuplicateConnectResponse_AfterAcceptance_DropsViaCheckState()
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{
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var clock = new VirtualClock();
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var model = new AceSessionModel(
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clock,
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FakeAceTransport.DefaultClientSeed,
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FakeAceTransport.DefaultServerSeed,
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FakeAceTransport.DefaultClientId,
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FakeAceTransport.DefaultCookie);
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int accepted = 0;
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model.ConnectResponseAccepted += () => accepted++;
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byte[] cookieBody = new byte[8];
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BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt64LittleEndian(
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cookieBody, FakeAceTransport.DefaultCookie);
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byte[] connectResponse = PacketCodec.Encode(
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new PacketHeader
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{
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Sequence = 1,
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Flags = PacketHeaderFlags.ConnectResponse,
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Id = 0,
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},
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cookieBody,
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null);
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// AuthenticationHandler moves the session to AuthConnectResponse
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// when the ConnectRequest goes out.
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model.SendConnectRequest();
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Assert.Equal(AceSessionState.AuthConnectResponse, model.State);
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model.Receive(connectResponse);
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Assert.Equal(AceSessionState.AuthConnected, model.State);
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Assert.Equal(1, accepted);
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Assert.Equal(0, model.StateDropCount);
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// The duplicate: CheckState clause 2 drops it pre-CRC.
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model.Receive(connectResponse);
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Assert.Equal(AceSessionState.AuthConnected, model.State);
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Assert.Equal(1, accepted);
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Assert.Equal(1, model.StateDropCount);
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Assert.Equal(0, model.CrcDropCount);
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Assert.Equal(0, model.DuplicateDropCount);
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Assert.Equal(256, model.Crypto.Headroom);
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}
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private static bool IsConnectResponse(byte[] datagram) =>
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datagram.Length >= PacketHeader.Size
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&& (BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt32LittleEndian(datagram.AsSpan(4))
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& (uint)PacketHeaderFlags.ConnectResponse) != 0;
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Campaign N Slice N6 — the transport end of the fragment-assembler
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/// eviction: <see cref="ReliableTransport.Sweep"/> runs
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/// <see cref="FragmentAssembler.SweepExpired"/> on retail's 5 s flush
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/// cadence (<c>Indicator::FlushTimedOutEphInfo @ 0x0054A3D0</c>).
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/// </summary>
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public sealed class ReliableTransportAssemblerSweepTests
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{
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[Fact]
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public void Sweep_EvictsAgedPartial_KeepsFreshOne()
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{
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var clock = new VirtualClock();
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var assembler = new FragmentAssembler(() => clock.Seconds);
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var transport = new ReliableTransport(
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MakeIsaac(0x11AA22BBu),
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MakeIsaac(0x33CC44DDu),
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0x1234,
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1,
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_ => { },
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new TransportClock(clock.GetTimestamp, clock.Frequency),
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assembler: assembler);
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// Park a partial at t=0.
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IngestPartial(assembler, sequence: 10);
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Assert.Equal(1, assembler.PartialCount);
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// Well under the TTL: sweeps run (5 s cadence) but evict nothing.
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clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30));
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transport.Sweep();
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Assert.Equal(1, assembler.PartialCount);
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// Park a second partial at t=58, then cross the first one's TTL.
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clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(28));
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IngestPartial(assembler, sequence: 11);
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clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(3.5)); // t = 61.5
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transport.Sweep();
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Assert.Equal(1, assembler.PartialCount); // 10 evicted, 11 kept
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transport.Dispose();
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}
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private static void IngestPartial(FragmentAssembler assembler, uint sequence)
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{
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var header = new MessageFragmentHeader
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{
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Sequence = sequence,
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Id = 0x80000000u,
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Count = 2,
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Index = 0,
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TotalSize = (ushort)(MessageFragmentHeader.Size + 1),
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Queue = 7,
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};
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byte[] payload = { 0x42 };
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Assert.False(assembler.TryIngest(
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new BorrowedMessageFragment(header, payload),
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out _,
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out _));
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}
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private static IsaacRandom MakeIsaac(uint seed)
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{
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Span<byte> seedBytes = stackalloc byte[4];
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BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt32LittleEndian(seedBytes, seed);
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return new IsaacRandom(seedBytes);
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}
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}
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