The #260 investigation ended in a full root cause: acdream cannot
survive a single lost UDP packet in either direction. Outbound: the
server''s RequestRetransmit lists are parsed and consumed nowhere, and
no sent-packet cache exists - one lost C2S datagram permanently stalls
ACE''s ordered stream (actions void, position updates void, new areas
never stream: the whole #260/#256 symptom set). Inbound: the ISAAC
keystream is burned in arrival order, so one lost S2C datagram
permanently desyncs the cipher. Loopback ACE never drops packets,
which is why every historical gate passed.
The campaign doc pins the port target from the named retail decomp
(SentPacketStore/FlowQueue resend with reused ISAAC keys, the inbound
pre-drawn-key NAK set, the 2.0s cumulative ack / 0.6s NAK shared-gate
sweep, constants), the ACE constraint table Coldeve enforces (the
256-key crypto window, the exactly-AckSequence watermark rule, the
cleartext-NAK requirement), the Transport/ class design, slices N0-N6
with per-slice gates and Fable/Opus review assignments, the landmine
list, and eight divergence-register rows for the pieces that are
unsafe against ACE''s watermark hole.
#260 updated to point here; its memory half is closed as benign
(mapped-pak page residency + designed cache ceilings - measured, not
a leak).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
