fix(security): don't mint new ID tokens on refresh; confirm offline_access gating

idpyoidc already gates refresh-token issuance on the offline_access scope
(verified by test), but the refresh-token grant was configured to also mint
fresh ID tokens. Drop id_token from the refresh_token grant's supports_minting
so refreshing yields only access (and a rotated refresh) token; ID tokens come
from authentication. Refresh-token rotation is retained.

Refs: porchlight-553

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Johan Lundberg 2026-06-10 09:25:49 +02:00
parent 519e3659a1
commit 27763d19ea
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GPG key ID: A6C152738D03C7D1
2 changed files with 72 additions and 3 deletions

View file

@ -67,7 +67,10 @@ def _build_server_config(settings: Settings) -> dict:
"expires_in": 3600, "expires_in": 3600,
}, },
"refresh_token": { "refresh_token": {
"supports_minting": ["access_token", "refresh_token", "id_token"], # Rotate refresh tokens (mint a new one) and mint
# access tokens, but do NOT mint fresh ID tokens on
# refresh — re-authentication should issue ID tokens.
"supports_minting": ["access_token", "refresh_token"],
"expires_in": 86400, "expires_in": 86400,
}, },
}, },

View file

@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ async def _setup_rp_and_user(app: FastAPI) -> None:
"redirect_uris": [(REDIRECT_URI, {})], "redirect_uris": [(REDIRECT_URI, {})],
"response_types_supported": ["code"], "response_types_supported": ["code"],
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic", "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
"scope": ["openid", "profile", "email"], "scope": ["openid", "profile", "email", "offline_access"],
"allowed_scopes": ["openid", "profile", "email"], "allowed_scopes": ["openid", "profile", "email", "offline_access"],
"client_salt": secrets.token_hex(8), "client_salt": secrets.token_hex(8),
} }
oidc_server.keyjar.add_symmetric(CLIENT_ID, CLIENT_SECRET) oidc_server.keyjar.add_symmetric(CLIENT_ID, CLIENT_SECRET)
@ -263,3 +263,69 @@ async def test_pkce_wrong_verifier_rejected(client: AsyncClient) -> None:
}, },
) )
assert res.status_code != 200, f"PKCE verifier mismatch should be rejected, got {res.status_code}: {res.text}" assert res.status_code != 200, f"PKCE verifier mismatch should be rejected, got {res.status_code}: {res.text}"
async def _authorize_with_offline_access(client: AsyncClient, state: str, nonce: str) -> str:
"""Run the auth-code flow requesting offline_access, return the auth code."""
scope = "openid profile offline_access"
# offline_access requires prompt=consent per the OIDC spec.
await client.get(
"/authorization",
params={
"response_type": "code",
"client_id": CLIENT_ID,
"redirect_uri": REDIRECT_URI,
"scope": scope,
"state": state,
"nonce": nonce,
"prompt": "consent",
},
follow_redirects=False,
)
token = await get_csrf_token(client)
await client.post(
"/login/password",
data={"username": "alice", "password": "testpass"},
headers={"HX-Request": "true", "X-CSRF-Token": token},
)
complete = await client.get("/authorization/complete", follow_redirects=False)
assert "/consent" in complete.headers["location"]
token = await get_csrf_token(client)
consent = await client.post(
"/consent",
data={"action": "allow", "scope": ["openid", "profile", "offline_access"]},
headers={"X-CSRF-Token": token},
follow_redirects=False,
)
return parse_qs(urlparse(consent.headers["location"]).query)["code"][0]
async def test_refresh_token_issued_only_with_offline_access(client: AsyncClient) -> None:
app = client._transport.app # type: ignore[union-attr]
await _setup_rp_and_user(app)
# Without offline_access: no refresh token.
code = await _login_and_authorize(client, secrets.token_urlsafe(8), secrets.token_urlsafe(8))
no_offline = await _exchange_token(client, code)
assert "refresh_token" not in no_offline
async def test_refresh_grant_does_not_mint_id_token(client: AsyncClient) -> None:
app = client._transport.app # type: ignore[union-attr]
await _setup_rp_and_user(app)
code = await _authorize_with_offline_access(client, secrets.token_urlsafe(8), secrets.token_urlsafe(8))
token_data = await _exchange_token(client, code)
assert "refresh_token" in token_data, "offline_access should yield a refresh token"
# Use the refresh token; the response must not contain a new ID token.
auth_header = b64encode(f"{CLIENT_ID}:{CLIENT_SECRET}".encode()).decode()
res = await client.post(
"/token",
data={"grant_type": "refresh_token", "refresh_token": token_data["refresh_token"]},
headers={"Authorization": f"Basic {auth_header}", "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"},
)
assert res.status_code == 200, res.text
refreshed = res.json()
assert "access_token" in refreshed
assert "id_token" not in refreshed